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ABSTRACT 
 
The South African Law Commission Project Committee submitted a report and draft Bill to 
Parliament on 8 August 2000 addressing the creation of a juvenile justice system.i Parliament has 
to date failed to implement legislation regulating juvenile justice in South Africa thereby failing 
to create a distinct juvenile justice system. The purpose of this paper is to consider the extent to 
which the judiciary has been developing juvenile justice practises in light of the fact that 
legislation regulating juvenile justice is practically non-existent. The development of the law by 
the judiciary is not unique to juvenile justice. However, it is worthwhile discussing the 
judiciaries’ involvement in the development of juvenile justice in light of challenges faced by the 
judiciary while developing this area of law. The challenging task faced by the judiciary involves 
developing juvenile justice practices which satisfies Constitutional and international principles 
while also adhering to the needs of the society. In South Africa, the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 
1977 governs children and adults who are accused of having committed a crime. Separate 
legislation governing children justice has to date not been implemented by Parliament. It is also 
interesting to note how in light of the inequalities of the past and the absence of legislation 
pertaining specifically to children, the judiciary grapples with giving effect to Constitutional and 
International principles such as the best interest of the child, the principle of last resort and the 
principle of proportionality, while still trying to give effect to the needs of the victim and society.  
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 J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Justice for children as victims and as offenders’ in CJ Davel (ed) Introduction to 
child law in South Africa (2000) 392 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A JUVENILE SENTENCING JURISPRUDENCE 
IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper seeks to consider the extent to which the South African Judiciary has 
developed sentencing jurisprudence in respect of juveniles in the absence of much 
anticipated domestic legislation. 
 
The role played by the judiciary in developing juvenile sentencing jurisprudence will 
be examined by way of an analysis of South African case law. It will be argued that 
domestic legislation is either vague, non-existent or in conflict with international 
juvenile sentencing norms. This will be achieved by considering both international 
and domestic legislation. It will also be argued that in the absence of domestic 
legislation, international law has played an influential role in the development of 
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence and that it will be seen from the case law that 
domestic law has been developed by the judiciary to meet constitutional norms and 
international standards. 
 
Three particular areas of juvenile justice development will be discussed in different 
chapters in this paper: pre- sentence reports; the principle of incarceration as a last 
resort and for the shortest possible period; and alternatives to sentencing. Each of 
these chapters will include a discussion of both international and domestic legislation 
in order to establish that domestic legislation does not meet international standards.  
The chapters will also include a discussion on South African case law to show that 
frequently, the judiciary has attempted to develop domestic legislation to meet 
international law standards. Furthermore, the submission by Julia Sloth-Nielson ‘that 
the international law regime has competed with local influences in shaping the 
process of juvenile justice reform, and, more specifically the process of new 
legislation contained in the Report’1 is supported by the writer hereof and is reflected 
in the case law. 
 
Each chapter will illustrate the growth of a juvenile justice framework despite the 
absence of legislation. Each chapter will also show the propensity of the judiciary to 
assist in the growth of a juvenile sentencing framework, which is in line with 
Constitutional and international norms. It will also be argued that the Child Justice 
Bill (hereinafter referred to as the Bill), though not always specifically mentioned in 
the cases, has also influenced the criminal justice system. In conclusion it will be 
argued that juvenile sentencing legislation is practically non-existent with regards to 
pre-sentence reports. It will also be argued that even though the principle of 
incarceration as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate time is a constitutionally 
entrenched principle, the principle is confused by the ambiguity of the wording of 
minimum sentence legislation.2  
 
 The remainder of this introduction briefly discusses the relevant international 
instruments and domestic legislation featuring in this paper and a short synopsis of S v 
Z and four other cases,3 is provided. It is important for the purposes of this paper to 
                                                
1
 J Sloth-Nielsen The role of international law in juvenile justice reform in South Africa (2001) 
Unpublished LLM dissertation at 15. The Report which Sloth-Nielson refers to is the South African 
Law Commission Report on Juvenile Justice (2000) Project 106 in which proposals were made for a 
justice system for juveniles. These proposals are reflected in the Child Justice Bill, B 49 of 2002.  
2
 Minimum sentence legislation is governed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997 
3
 1999 (1) SACR 427 (E) 
refer to the S v Z judgment as it lays the foundation for many later decisions in respect 
of developing juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. 
 
1.1 Relevant international instruments 
There is a coherent body of international law dealing with juveniles, some binding 
others not but yet still persuasive. South Africa is bound to the provisions of The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child4 (hereinafter referred to as 
CRC), having ratified the CRC in 1995. In ratifying the CRC, South Africa became 
bound by its provisions and had to refrain from acts, which would defeat the purpose 
of the treaty.5 International law has played an important role in shaping juvenile 
justice in South Africa because of the weight afforded to it by the Constitution6 and 
thus the judiciary. Important elements of the CRC are reflected in the Constitution.7 In 
particular, the principles of incarceration as a last resort and best interests of the child 
are specifically mentioned in the Constitution.8 The CRC features prominently in all 
three chapters concerning juvenile sentencing jurisprudence as the provisions 
contained in Articles 37 and 40 of the CRC are referred to in many of the cases 
discussed in this paper. Article 37 (a), (b), (c) and Article 40(1), (2) (b) (iv), (3) and 
(4) are the specific provisions considered in the case law and are attached to a 
Appendix A, which is attached hereto.                                                                                           
 
                                                
4
 Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1989, Resolution 44/25 
5
 J Sloth-Nielsen op cit n 1 at 27 
6
 Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  Section 39 (1) (b) states that a court must 
interpret international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
7
 J Sloth-Nielsen op cit n 1 at 31 
8
 Specifically in s 28 (1)(g), the principle of detention as a last resort and  s 28 (2), the best interest 
principle.  
It is clear from the above provisions that the CRC adopts a ‘child centred’9 approach 
with the primary focus being the best interests of the child and which reflects the 
notion of restorative justice. Also evident from the CRC is the move away from the 
welfare and justice paradigms in favour of regarding the child as an individual thereby 
assessing each child separately.10 The aforementioned ideals are also reflected in the 
Constitution11 and have been reiterated in the case law.12 
                                       
Other key international instruments mentioned in the case law are The United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (‘The Beijing 
Rules’)13 and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of 
their Liberty (‘UN JDL Rules’).14 Though the Beijing and UN JDL Rules have not 
been ratified by South Africa, their provisions should be considered, as many of the 
provisions contained in these rules have been codified in the Convention on the Rights  
of the Child15 and the Constitutional Court has confirmed that both binding and non-
binding legislation may be referred to when interpreting the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.16 The strength of these rules and guidelines arguably form part of customary  
 
 
                                                
9
 A Skelton, ‘Developing a juvenile justice system for South Africa: international instruments and 
restorative justice’ 1995 Acta Juridica at 181 
10
 J Sloth- Nielsen‘Justice for children as victims and as offenders’ in CJ Davel (ed) Introduction to 
child law in South Africa (2000) 392 
11
 In terms of section 28 (1)(g) ‘every child has the right not to be detained except as a measure of last  
   resort, in which case in addition to the rights the child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may   
   only be detained for the shortest period of time….’. Section 28 (2) provides that ‘A child’s best  
   are of paramount importance…’ giving constitutional effect to the common law and international  
   ‘best interest of the child principle’.  
12
 For example in the cases of S v Petersen en n Ander 2001(1) SACR 16 SCA, Brandt v S [2005] 2 
ALL SA 1 (SCA) and S v Kwalase 2000(2) SACR 135 (C). 
13
 Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 29 November 1985, Resolution 40/33 
14
 Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 14 December 1990, Resolution 45/113 
15
 G van Bueren The international law on the rights of the child (1995) at 170  
16
 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 656  
international law and as such provide a strong yardstick against which national 
legislation can be measured. 
 
1.2 South African legislation 
Unlike the coherent body of international law governing juvenile justice, South 
Africa’s juvenile justice is conducted according to a piecemeal framework. Currently 
the only tangible domestic protection afforded to children in trouble with the law can 
be found in ss28 (1) (g) (h) and (i) of the Constitution,17 which provide: 
 
‘Every child has the right   
g. not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the 
rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the 
shortest appropriate period of time, and has the right to be 
 i. kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and  
ii. treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the child's 
age;  
h. to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in 
civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result; 
and  
i. not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed 
conflict.’  
 
Section 35 of the Constitution provides for the rights of arrested, detained and 
convicted persons while s12 provides for the Freedom and security of all people. 
Children enjoy the protections provided for in ss12, 28 and 35. These rights accrue to 
children and are in accordance with international standards.  
 
                                                
17
 Constitution of South Africa, 1996 
The South African Law Commission report was presented to the Minister of Justice in 
2001 and draft legislation, the Child Justice Bill was debated in parliament in 2001.18 
The Bill has still not been passed by parliament but the absence of juvenile justice 
legislation has not impeded development of juvenile justice. Important juvenile justice 
reforms have been implemented by the judiciary by taking into account international 
legislation, the Constitution, the Bill and the’ best interest of the child’ principle. This 
trend is evident in S v Z. 19 Being one of the first post-constitutional cases it ushered in 
the beginning of a progressive constitutional approach in sentencing juveniles. In the 
absence of implied legislation the court in S v Z laid down its own guidelines, some of 
which have been confirmed by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the guidelines laid 
down in S v Z have been referred to several later judgments20 and therefore merit 
closer consideration.    
 
1.3 The beginning of a progressive approach in the new Constitutional 
dispensation 
Influenced by the approach adopted by the Constitutional Court in S v Williams,21 
Erasmus J, in S v Z, held that the decision of the Constitutional Court in Williams 
reflected a need for the ‘development of a law which is in line with the spirit, purport 
and object of the Constitution’.22 The judge held that the courts must therefore 
consider current sentencing options in a new light and develop sentencing options in  
                                                
18
 Sloth-Nielsen J, Muntingh J L ‘Juvenile justice review 1999 - 2000’ (2001) 
http://www.sn.ac.apc.org/users/clc/children/jjreview.doc accessed 19 September 2006 
19
 supra n 3 
20
 For example S v Kwalase supra n 12, S v Peterson supra n 12 (pre – sentence reports) ; M v The 
senior Prosecutor  (alternative sentencing options) 
21
 1995 (3) SA E 632 (C)  
22
 S v Z supra n 3 pg 430 at para E 
line with our new constitutional dispensation. He reasoned that the development of a 
more progressive juvenile sentencing jurisprudence is particularly important, in light 
of the fact that children are, to their detriment, easily influenced.23 Erasmus J also 
addressed the harsh reality of imprisoning a child, which in his view involved more 
than the mere deprivation of liberty.24 The child is forced to grow up in a whole new 
world – one which will shape the rest of that child’s life.25 Ultimately, imprisonment 
could do more harm than good for both the child and the interests of the community 
as instead of being rehabilitated and reintegrated back into society, imprisonment 
could have the effect of creating a seasoned criminal, a risk more prominent in 
children than adults, given how impressionable children are.  
 
All four accused in S v Z had received suspended sentences after they were found 
guilty of theft and housebreaking with the intent to steal. The court conducted an in 
depth investigation by exploring the different options available when sentencing 
juveniles. The enquiry included a report prepared by the Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecutions, a visit to the prison facility housing the juveniles, interviews with 
officials of the Department of Correctional Services and consideration of a circular 
instruction issued to prosecutors by the Director of Public Prosecutions.  
 
 
 
                                                
23
 at para G - H 
24
 at para  J 
25
 at 431para A 
In light of the court’s findings and in an attempt to develop juvenile sentencing 
jurisprudence in line with constitutional and international legislation, the following 
guidelines were laid down by the Judge: 
1. The court shall, before commencement of the trial, consider in certain cases the progress 
of the accused in a juvenile program. 
2. For the purposes of sentencing the court must meticulously consider age and personal 
circumstances of the accused. If it appears that an incorrect age is reflected on the charge 
sheet, then the court must correct the record to ensure that the correct age of the child is 
reflected on the charge sheet.  
3. The court must ensure that the complete personal circumstances of the accused are placed 
before the court. Where necessary the court must request a report from a probation 
officer. It is essential to request a report where the accused is convicted of a serious 
offence or has a previous conviction. It will be inappropriate to sentence an accused to a 
period of imprisonment, or a suspended sentence, without having considered the 
probation officer’s report.  
4. The court must carefully and imaginatively use its wide discretion to determine a sentence 
that is appropriate and suitable to each individual accused taking into account their 
personal circumstances and the type of crime which the accused was found guilty of. 
5. The court must as far as possible avoid a sentence of imprisonment, especially when 
considering the following:       
a. The younger the accused, the more inappropriate a sentence of imprisonment. 
b.   Imprisonment is especially inappropriate with regard to first time offenders. 
c.  A short period of imprisonment is rarely appropriate and therefore the court must 
always consider the appropriateness of all other sentencing options. If it appears 
after considering all options, that imprisonment is the only appropriate sentence, 
then the will have to impose a sentence of imprisonment. 
              6    The court must not impose a suspended sentence where a sentence in the form of    
       imprisonment would have been inappropriate. 
 
It is clear from the above guidelines that the age and personal circumstances of the 
accused are of paramount importance when determining an appropriate sentence. The 
above guidelines also reflect a strong international law influence and are especially 
reflective of the Beijing rules.26 These guidelines clearly reflect a move on the part of 
the judiciary to adopt a more child-centred approach in developing sentencing  
principles by treating each child as an individual as advocated by the CRC.  
 
                                                
26
 This statement will be discussed more substantially in chapters 1, 2 and 3. 
S v Z has contributed to the development of juvenile sentencing legislation 
particularly with regard to the development of pre-sentence reports27 and alternative 
sentencing options.28 The guidelines laid down in this case have also been endorsed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal 29 and are thus referred to throughout this paper. 
 
The above discussion provided a brief context for the argument that juvenile 
sentencing practice is shaped by the judiciary to conform with international and 
constitutional law in the absence of legislation. The remainder of this paper will focus 
on an in-depth discussion of juvenile sentencing jurisprudence by tracing its 
development through pivotal case law, as it pertains to the selected three 
constitutional and international principles discussed in this paper, namely pre-
sentence reports, the principle of incarceration as a last resort and alternative 
sentencing options.  
 
 
 
 
 
2. THE RATIONALE BEHIND ‘GIVING CHILDREN A CHANCE’30 
The plight of children detained in prisons is aptly described in the following poem: 
                                                
27
 see chapter 3 
28
 see chapter 5 
29
 See S v Peterson supra n 12 
30
 D Pinnock, A Skelton and R Shapiro ‘New juvenile justice legislation for South Africa: Giving 
children a chance’ (1994) Occasional Paper series 3 – 94 cited on 
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/sjrp/publicat/newjust.htm accessed 10 September 2007 
‘I have been sent to 
Sea Point Police Station, 
Where I was beaten by civil servants, 
I have been to Polsmoor Prison, 
Where I was sodomised 
And left bleeding 
On the damp floor. 
I have been to 
Places of Safety and Reformatories 
Where I was hardened by 
Warders and fellow inmates, 
Where I learned to hold on 
To what was mine and take 
From those who could not fight. 
I am now the perpetrator of violence 
And not the victim. 
On the streets 
I am a law unto myself.’31 
 
Subjecting children to punishments which include assault, torture and sexual 
molestation is cruel and inhumane and should not be tolerated in a civilized society. 
The Apartheid regimes treatment of children was characterised by unjust treatment of 
children, by often detaining them, without recourse to courts, for the political 
beliefs.32   
Child justice reformers have taken on the battle against abuse of juveniles, an abuse 
which is legitimised by the State, particularly, the criminal justice system. A seminar33 
was held in Cape Town in 1993 to discuss the plight of children in trouble with the 
law and the way forward. Key political figures who attended the conference included 
Dullah Omar, Bridgette Mabadla, Kader Asmal and Jacob Zuma.34  
 
It was asserted at the seminar that the brutal treatment of children in trouble with the 
law is a product of the Apartheid regime. It was further asserted that even though 
                                                
31
 Poem by Glen Leedenberg cited in D Pinnock op cit n 31 
32
 J Sloth-Nielsen op cit n 10 at 389 
33
 Community Law Centre (CLC) ‘Report of the international seminar on “children in trouble with the 
law” (1993) 
34
 Community Law Centre supra n 33 at 8 
South Africa had laid Apartheid to rest, many children were still feeling the effects of 
the discriminatory regime as ‘poverty, homelessness, rural-urban migration, 
inadequate schooling and false arrests persists’.35 The effects of the Apartheid regime 
on children necessitate a transformation of the criminal justice system into a child 
justice system. As products of a former repressive regime, children of a democratic 
South Africa are just as much victims of the former regime as political child prisoners 
were in the past.36 
 
Evidence of the repressive regime’s treatment of children is still clearly visible in 
criminal justice system which has one system of law dealing with child and adult 
offenders.37 Skelton comments that the ‘juvenile justice system has generally treated 
juveniles as smaller versions of adult offenders’.38 The cases discussed in this paper 
highlights the effects of the disparities of the past as many of the child offenders come 
from impoverished communities, had difficult childhoods, belong to gangs and have 
spent most of their lives in the prison system. Also evidence of the effect of the  
former repressive regime is the fact that the majority of the prison population are 
comprised of black and ‘coloured’ inmates. According to the Department of 
Correctional Supervision, statistics for the year 2006/2007 indicate that the sentenced  
prison population is comprised of 534 Asian prisoners, 2175 White prisoners, 20 645 
‘Coloured’ prisoners and 88 742 Black prisoners.39 The Department statistics 
unfortunately do not indicate what percentage of the each population group is 
comprised of child prisoners.  However, one is inclined to surmise, in light of the 
                                                
35
 Community Law Centre supra n 33 at 14 
36
 Sloth-Nielsen supra n 10 
37
 The Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 is the governing legislation in respect of offences committed 
by children and adults. 
38
 A Skelton supra n 9 at 180 
39
 Department of Correctional Supervision website http://www.dcs.gov.za/WebStatistics/  
extreme difference in numbers, that the Black and ‘Coloured’ child prison population 
should significantly exceed the White and Asian population groups.  
 
Law reform in the area of child justice was one of the key objectives of the new 
democratic South Africa. In his opening address to Parliament in 1994, former 
President Nelson Mandela said 
 
‘The Government will as a matter of urgency, attend to the tragic and complex question of 
children and juveniles in detention and prison. The basic principle from which we will proceed 
from now onwards is that we must rescue the children of the nation and ensure that the system 
of criminal justice must be the very last resort in the case of juvenile offender’.40 
 
There have been developments in the area of child justice since the former President’s 
opening address confirming the importance allocated to reforming the child justice 
system. For instance, the CRC was ratified by South Africa in 1995, binding South 
Africa to international principles in respect of treatment of children. Another 
development occurred in 1996 when the Final Constitution41 came into effect. Key 
international principles, such as the best interests of the child and incarceration as a 
measure of last resort for shortest period of time were entrenched in the Constitution. 
In 1997 the South African Law Commission project committee commenced an 
enquiry in respect of the development of juvenile justice. The committee eventually 
produced a Child Justice Bill,42 with the view that it would be the governing 
legislation in respect of a procedural system for child offenders. The contents of the 
                                                
40
 Cited in Skelton ‘Transforming the youth and child justice system’ (2005) 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo14/childjustice.html  (accessed 19 September 2006).  
41
 Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
42
 B 49 of 2002 
Bill were made known on 8 August 2000 and have been the subject of much debate 
since then. Deliberations in respect of the Bill occurred in 2003 and various changes 
were recommended.43 The Bill has to date not been implemented and further 
discussions in respect of the Bill have become disturbingly silent.  
 
It is possible that the delay by Parliament in passing the Bill relates to the opposing 
needs of the child offenders and society. Government may find it difficult to 
adequately satisfy both needs. The Bill is largely characterised by the principle of 
restorative justice while societal demands in a growing crime infested environment 
call for stricter forms of punishment. 
 
The challenge now faced by judiciary is to merge together the various needs of 
children and society and produce law which satisfies both needs. The law produced by  
the judiciary must comply with constitutional and international norms and be mindful 
of South Africa’s oppressive past. The rest of the discussion illustrates how the 
judiciary has taken on this challenging task, in the absence of legislation and 
developed a child justice system which takes into account all the aforementioned 
difficulties.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
43
 L Ehlers ‘Child justice in South Africa: children’s rights under construction’ (2006) Criminal justice 
initiative occasional paper at 5 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS 
3.1 International instruments and policies  
Geraldine van Bueren argues that the purpose of sentencing a child in trouble with the 
law is to ensure that both the needs of the child and society are met. The punishment 
must therefore be proportional, taking into account the offence committed and the 
personal circumstances of the offender.44 This argument is sound, as children, unlike 
their adult counterparts are more likely to make bad choices due to their youthfulness 
and immaturity. The common law has always recognised that children may not always 
have the necessary capacity to be responsible for their actions and therefore the 
criminal liability of a child has always been linked to the age of the offender. The 
younger the child, the less likely the possibility that the child had the necessary 
                                                
44
 G Van Bueren op cit n 15 at 183 
capacity to understand the wrongfulness of their actions or act in accordance with this 
understanding.45 Children should therefore be given the benefit of the doubt by taking 
into account the personal circumstances of each individual child prior to sentencing. 
 
The Beijing Rules46 therefore recommends that: 
‘In all cases except those involving minor offences, before the competent authority renders the 
final disposition prior to sentencing, the background and circumstances in which the juvenile 
is living or the conditions under which the offence has been committed shall be properly 
investigated so as to facilitate judicious adjudication of the case by the competent authority’.  
 
The commentary47 to Beijing Rule 16 stresses the importance of pre-sentence reports 
in legal proceedings involving juveniles. It provides that parties must make social 
resources in the form of probation officers, or other social services personnel, 
available to child offenders in order to conduct enquiries into the relevant personal 
circumstances of the child accused. The discussion below will show that this 
international rule is not reflected in South African legislation as currently legislation 
regarding pre-sentence reports is practically non-existent. 
 
3.2 South African legislation and law reform proposals 
The Criminal Procedure Act48 governs procedure in respect of child and adult 
offenders and provides a very basic outline concerning sentencing of juveniles. 
Section 290 of the Criminal Procedure Act describes the manner in which the court 
should deal with convicted persons who are below the age of 18. In terms of the 
                                                
45
 J M Burchell Principles  of criminal law 3rd ed (2005) at 358  
46
 Beijing Rule 16 
47
 see commentary to R16 
48
 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
section the juvenile should be ‘placed under the supervision of a probation or 
correctional officer’ or, ‘in the custody of a suitable person designated by the court’ 
or, ‘be sent to a reform school’ as opposed to direct imprisonment.  It will be seen 
from the case law concerning pre-sentence reports that ordinarily pre-sentence reports 
are drafted by probation officers or correctional supervisors. The s290 provision is the 
only provision relating to pre-sentence reports, yet this provision does not specifically 
refer to pre-sentence reports. The provision is also vague, as it does not stipulate 
which factors need to be taken into account when placing the child under the 
supervision of the probation/correctional officer, what the responsibility of the officer 
is in respect of the juvenile, how such placement occurs and the what duties of the 
probation officer or correctional supervisor are. 
 
Law reform regarding pre-sentence reports has been proposed and is reflected in the 
Bill. The Law Commission Report49 reflects support for compulsory pre-sentence 
reports. As a result of recommendations made in the Law Commission Report, the 
Bill includes provisions relating to pre-sentence reports. Section 62 of the Bill 
stipulates that a court imposing a sentence must request a pre-sentence report before 
imposing a sentence. The court must record reasons for deviation from 
recommendations made in the probation officer’s report where the court imposes a 
sentence other than that recommended in the report.50 Concerns highlighted in the 
Law Commission report regarding undue-delays in obtaining a pre-sentence report 
were noted and accounted for in the Bill.  Provisions were made for dispensing with 
the pre-sentence report in instances where undue delays would occur or in cases of 
                                                
49
 South African Law Commission Report op cit  n1at 175 
50
 S62(3) 
petty offences.51 However, a protection mechanism was included for juveniles who 
faced a suspended sentence or imprisonment in that such a sentence could not be 
imposed without a report submitted by the probation officer.                                                                             
 
Although the pre-sentence report is not as yet a statutory requirement, the production 
of the pre-sentence report has become an integral aspect of juvenile sentencing 
requirements. This is clearly reflected in the case law.52   
3.3 South African case law on pre-sentence reports 
The importance of pre-sentence reports has been emphasised by the courts,53 even 
before the advent of the Constitution.54  Considering the personal circumstances of the 
accused and the production of a probation officer report are therefore not new 
concepts in our law. The case of Jansen55 indicates that even as early as 1975, the 
courts were aware that juveniles had to be treated differently from adult accused. The 
court in Jansen recognised that the interests of society were best served by taking into 
account the interests of the juvenile. It would not be in the best interest of society to 
return a distorted individual to it.  S v Z was the first post-constitutional case to refer 
to the importance of pre-sentence reports. 
 
 Pre-sentence reports provide a background to the personal circumstances of the 
accused and allows for each accused to be treated as an individual.56  Kwalase57 is one 
of the earlier post-constitutional cases stressing the importance of pre-sentence 
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reports. This case is important because it restates the principles laid down in SvZ and 
emphasises the importance of an individualised approach in sentencing juveniles.58 
 
The accused in Kwalase was found guilty of robbery and was sentenced to three years 
imprisonment, eighteen months of which of which were suspended for three years on 
condition that the accused not be convicted again of a dishonest crime. At the time of 
the commission of the offence, the accused was almost 16 years old and had a 
previous conviction for housebreaking and theft, for which he obtained a postponed 
sentence. Prior to sentencing in this matter he had already committed another offence 
of robbery, for which he was also found guilty and sentenced to three months 
imprisonment. The personal circumstances of the accused in the latter robbery charge 
were not placed on record and the probation officer report was not requested by the 
magistrate. 
 
Van Heerden J (as she was then) stressed the importance of probation officer reports 
by referring to South African case law as well as constitutional and international 
legislation. She referred to the pre-constitutional case of S v Jansen59 in which the 
Appellate Division emphasised the importance of a pre-sentence report.  
 
The court in Jansen held that: 
‘In determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon an accused person in any 
particular case, it is the duty of the court to have regard, not only to the nature of the crime 
committed and the interests of society, but also the personality, age and circumstances of the 
offender …. in the case of a juvenile offender it is above all necessary for a court to determine 
what appropriate form of punishment in the peculiar circumstances of the case would best 
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serve the interests of society as well as the interests of the juvenile. The interests of society 
cannot be served by disregarding the interests of the juvenile, for a mistaken form of 
punishment might easily result in a person with distorted personality being eventually returned 
to society. To enable the court to determine the most appropriate form of punishment in the 
case of a juvenile offender, it has become the established practice of the courts to call for a 
probation officer, in at least all serious cases…’ 60 
 
 
Van Heerden J also referred to the guidelines laid down by the court in S v Z. The 
judge further highlighted the importance of the probation officer report by referring to 
international instruments which call for a pre-sentence report prior to sentencing 
juveniles. She noted that the Commentary to the Rule 16 of the Beijing Rules 
considers ‘social enquiry reports’ to be ‘an ‘indispensable aid’ in legal proceedings 
involving juveniles’.61 The court, though not obligated in terms of the Beijing rules to  
request a pre-sentence report prior to sentencing, considered the importance of a pre-
sentence reports crucial to the enquiry. The judge’s decision was influenced by 
principles of individualised sentencing and proportionality.  She reasoned that:   
 
‘the judicial approach towards sentencing juvenile offenders must therefore be reappraised and 
developed in order to promote an individualised response which is not only in proportion to 
the nature and gravity of the offence and the needs of society, but which is also appropriate to 
the needs and interest of the juvenile offender. If at all possible, the sentencing officer must 
structure the punishment in such a way so as to promote the reintegration of the juvenile 
concerned into his or her family and community.’62 
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Reference was also made to the Bill in respect of pre-sentence reports. The court 
acknowledged that the recommendations made by the project committee concerning 
mandatory pre-sentence reports in the case of imprisonment of the juvenile had gained 
strong support.63  
 
In light of these constitutional and international principles and the development of the 
law as reflected in the Bill, the court found that the magistrate could not have properly  
considered the proportionality requirement without due consideration to the personal 
circumstances of the accused. The judge found that the magistrate, in sentencing the 
accused, had only considered the aggravating factors relating to the accused’s 
previous convictions. The magistrate had not taken the accused’s personal 
circumstance and youthfulness into account when imposing the sentence of direct 
imprisonment. The court therefore failed to see how the magistrate could have 
determined an appropriate sentence. Van Heerden J therefore set aside the sentence of 
the magistrate and replaced it with a more lenient sentence, though the accused was 
still sentenced to imprisonment.  
 
Kwalase is an important judgment because it clearly sets out the factors taken into 
account by the courts in determining juvenile sentencing principles. It indicates the 
significant role international law plays in the decision making process. It is evident 
that there exists a tendency by the courts to support the international law notion of an 
individualised approach in sentencing considerations relating to children.  Also 
evident from this judgment is the strong emphasis placed on the Bill. It is furthermore 
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clear that in determining a just sentence equal weight must be attributed to both the 
interests of society and the juvenile accused.  
 
Though the judgment is an extremely welcome precedent, it is not immune to 
criticism. It is disappointing that the Judge failed to practically execute her own 
finding. Though she emphasised the importance of a pre-sentence report, especially 
where the juvenile accused is sentenced to imprisonment, and despite finding it 
unacceptable that the magistrate sentenced the accused to direct imprisonment without 
taking into consideration the personal circumstances of the accused, she too imposed a 
sentence of imprisonment without a pre-sentence report. While the sentence itself is 
not questioned, this judgment would have been far more credible if the Judge had 
requested a pre-sentence report prior to imposing the converted sentence. 
 
The opportunity for the Supreme Court of Appeal to join the discourse on pre-
sentence reports arose in S v Petersen.64 The accuseds in this matter had been 
convicted of murder and possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition and 
were sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. The court requested a probation officer’s 
report prior to sentence. The probation officer failed to produce the pre-sentence 
report. Instead, a letter from the Regional Director of Social Welfare Services was 
handed in to court explaining reasons for the absence of the probation officer report.  
 
The letter provided reasons for the probation officer’s failure to conduct an enquiry 
into the accused’s personal circumstances. Included in the reasons provided to the 
court were that, the probation officer would have had to conduct the enquiry in an 
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unsafe area, that the accused continued to deny guilt and that their parents were 
prescriptive about the sentence to be imposed. The court sentenced the accused to 
imprisonment despite the absence of a pre-sentence report. The accused appealed to 
the High Court against the sentence imposed by the trial court. A full bench of the 
Eastern Cape Division refused to hear the appeal finding that a sentence of 
imprisonment of 18 years was not heavy enough to warrant interference on the part of 
the High Court.65 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed with the Full Bench of the Eastern Cape 
Division. The Court took into account factors such as the age of the accused, the fact 
that they were first time offenders and that the sentence imposed exceeded the age of 
each accused.66 It further added that a sentence of imprisonment should not be 
imposed on a juvenile without a pre-sentence report detailing the personal 
circumstances and background of the accused.67 Furthermore, a sentence of 
imprisonment should not be imposed without seriously considering all other 
sentencing options.68  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal referred to and endorsed the sentencing guidelines 
identified by the Court in S v Z.69 Judge Olivier stressed the importance of the judicial 
officer playing a dynamic role in the sentencing process. He further found that the 
trial court had not played a dynamic role in the sentencing process in this matter and 
that, while the sentence imposed may well be a just sentence, it was not possible to  
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make such a determination if paragraphs three and four of the S v Z sentencing 
guidelines were not fully adhered to.70 This matter was therefore sent back to the trial 
court for reconsideration of the sentence based on the necessary information obtained 
from a pre-sentence report.  
 
It is clearly evident from this judgment that pre-sentence reports form a vital part of 
the sentencing process especially where the sentence imposed involves the direct 
imprisonment of juveniles. Failure by the social worker to submit a report detailing  
the personal circumstances of the accused will not be accepted and the court should 
not impose a sentence without a pre-sentence report. The fact that this judgment was 
also made available to the Director of Social Services further indicates the importance 
which the court attributes to pre-sentence reports. It clearly brings across the message 
that pre-sentence reports are compulsory, excuses will not be accepted, probation 
officers will have to ascertain the personal circumstances of the accuseds by whatever 
means necessary and the sentencing court cannot impose a sentence of imprisonment 
without the pre-sentence report. Also welcoming from this judgment is the approval 
of paragraphs three and four of the sentencing guidelines articulated by Judge 
Erasmus in S v Z. 
 
The requirement of pre-sentence reports has now become a well established principle 
in South African case law. This point is illustrated by the case of S v M.71  In 
reviewing the case of M, Pickering J identified two problems associated with this case 
in that the accussed’s were had been convicted without the assistance of their parents 
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or guardians and without a pre-sentence report. For the purposes of this paper, the 
writer will only deal with the issue pertaining to the magistrate’s failure to obtain a 
probation officer’s report.  
 
It was found that the Magistrate erred by sentencing the accused without a probation 
officer’s report. The court noted that this matter was postponed on numerous 
occasions in an attempt to obtain a probation officer’s report until the magistrate 
eventually sentenced the accused without the report. The Judge held that the 
magistrate should have played a more dynamic role in the proceedings and should 
have requested that the probation officer furnish reasons for not submitting the 
report.72 Instead the Magistrate sentenced the accused to imprisonment without 
adequate evidence concerning the accused’s personal circumstances. This matter was 
therefore referred back to the magistrate for the purpose of obtaining a probation 
officer’s report.  
 
Despite the importance of probation officer reports being stressed by the courts, it is 
clear that the courts should not merely rubber stamp these reports. The case of S v P73 
shows that the judicial officer is still the final adjudicator when sentencing an 
accused.  
 
S v P74 concerned conflicting recommendations made by the probation officer 
concerning the imposed sentence. The 16 year old accused had been found guilty of  
theft of a dog collar. In the first report the probation officer recommended that the 
accused receive a postponed sentence and that the accused ‘submit himself to the 
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supervision and control of a probation officer, rendering community service, re-
enrolling at school and carrying out the reasonable instructions of the probation 
officer’.75 
 
The probation officer then produced a second report recommending that the accused 
be sentenced to a reformatory school. There was nothing in the second report to 
justify the extreme difference in the recommendation.76 There was no indication from 
the second report of a significant change in the personal circumstances of the 
accused.77 The only difference regarding personal circumstances was that the accused 
had voluntarily returned to school without yet being instructed to do so by a formal 
court order.78 There was only a time difference of one month between the two 
reports.79 The Magistrate had clearly not applied his mind when imposing the 
sentence and had merely rubber stamped the probation officer’s second 
recommendation that the accused be sentenced to a reformatory school.  
 
On review, Justice Moosa reconsidered the information contained in the two reports. 
He found that imposing a sentence subjecting the accused to reformatory school was 
not justified when considering the evidence regarding the accused’s personal 
circumstances. The court therefore set aside the sentence imposed by the magistrate 
and referred the matter back to the trial court for reconsideration of the sentence.   
 
The judiciary has not only been active in developing juvenile sentencing principles in 
line with international standards in respect of pre-sentence reports. A similar trend can  
                                                
75
 at  71 I and 72 A 
76
 at 72 F - G 
77
 Ibid 
78
 Ibid 
79
 Ibid 
be seen in its adherence to the principle of incarceration as a last resort and for the 
shortest possible period. The following chapter considers international and national 
legislation in respect of the aforementioned principle and also the courts development 
of the law in line with the principle. The impact of minimum sentence legislation will 
also be discussed in this regard.     
 
4. THE PRINCIPLE OF INCARCERATION AS A LAST RESORT AND 
FOR THE SHORTEST APPROPRIATE PERIOD  
4.1 International instruments and policies    
 
Article 37(3) (b) of the CRC stipulates that the incarceration of children should be 
implemented as a measure of last resort and for the shortest period of time. In terms of 
Article 37, State Parties are obligated make available alternative forms of punishment 
for children in trouble with the law and only rely on detention mechanisms when the 
alternative measures are not sufficient.80 Detention as a measure of last resort is also 
addressed and reinforced in the Beijing Rules.81  
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(a) Care, guidance and supervision orders;  
(b) Probation; 
(c) Community service orders;  
(d) Financial penalties, compensation and restitution;  
(e) Intermediate treatment and other treatment orders; 
(f) Orders to participate in group counselling and similar activities;  
(g) Orders concerning foster care, living communities or other educational settings;  
(h) Other relevant orders.  
 
The Commentary to the Beijing Rules explains the reasoning behind the principle of 
imprisonment as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate time. The 
commentary provides that there is no evidence to show that it is better to imprison a 
juvenile than not to do so. In fact, imprisonment of the juveniles can cause more harm 
than good as the juvenile will be exposed to negative influences during his or her 
developing years. The negative effects resulting from loss of dignity and separation 
from the social environment has a more detrimental impact on the well being of  
juveniles, who because of youth, are easily influenced and who are still in the process 
of developing their character, than it would ordinarily have on adults. The prison 
world is a rude awakening to the juvenile, who is still at an age where behaviour can 
be modified in a positive or negative manner.  Accordingly, rule 19 aims at restricting 
institutionalisation in two regards: by limiting sentences of incarceration (‘last resort’) 
and by limiting the length of the sentence (shortest appropriate period). The UN JDL 
further reinforces this principle.82  
 
‘ The overriding message of the JDL’s is that young people under the age of 18 should not be 
deprived of the liberty except as a measure of last resort, and that where this does occur, each 
young person must be dealt with as an individual, having his or her needs met as far as 
possible’83 
 
It is therefore clear from the international instruments discussed above that in keeping 
with the principle of incarceration as last resort State parties are obliged to develop 
legislation which provides for alternatives to incarceration. Foreign jurisdictions have 
attempted to adhere to this principle by incorporating it in their legislation. The 
discussion below briefly looks at a small sample of foreign legislation in a very basic 
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attempt aimed at showing how foreign jurisdictions adhere to the principle of 
incarceration as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period. However, the 
scope of this paper is not intended to deal with a comparative analysis of foreign 
jurisdictions implementation of the principle.  
 
 In Canada, the Youth Criminal Justice Act limits the incarceration of juveniles to 
violent offences and repeat offenders.84 The sentencing officer is directed to impose 
imprisonment as a last resort.85 Where imprisonment is imposed the period of 
imprisonment cannot exceed 7 to 10 years.86  
 
The Beijing rules in respect of imprisonment of children have been incorporated in 
German legislation.87 According to German legislation, imprisonment can only be 
imposed as a measure of last resort and only in cases where the accused is convicted 
of a serious crime.88 However, prison convictions are limited to children between the 
ages of 14 and 17 and the term of imprisonment cannot exceed 10 years.89 The 
German legislature has therefore limited the power of the court in imposing prison 
sentences on child offenders by prescribing the length of the sentence and the 
applicable age category.   
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According to the Ugandan Children’s Statute of 1996, no child may receive a prison 
sentence exceeding three years even though an adult would have received the death 
sentence for the crime.90  
 
Not all foreign jurisdictions have given effect to the principle of incarceration as a last 
resort. For instance, in Australia, it is possible to impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment on a juvenile. In England, children convicted of serious crimes could be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment ‘at Her Majesty’s pleasure’.91 Child offenders 
imprisoned during Her Majesty’s pleasure were detained for an indeterminate period 
at the discretion of the Home Secretary.92 In Hussain v The United Kingdom, 93 the 
European Court of Human Rights found that sentences ‘at Her Majesty’s pleasure ‘is 
more comparable to a discretionary life sentence’.94 Subsequent to Hussain, s 28 of 
the Crime (Sentence) Act was brought into force to give effect to the judgment of the 
court in Hussain.95 Now the parole board and not the Secretary of State decide on the 
release of the prisoner once the sentence period has been completed.96 However, 
incarceration of child offenders remains part of the law of England.  
  
 Foreign case law also indicate difficulties experienced by other jurisdictions in 
adhering to the principle of incarceration as a last resort and for the shortest 
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appropriate time.. In this regard the cases of Nielsen v Denmark97, and T v The United 
Kingdom98  bears reference. T v the United Kingdom must also be mentioned since 
this case was recently referred to in two recent South African judgements.99 
 
 
4.2Difficulties experienced by foreign jurisdictions in giving effect to the 
principle of incarceration as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period 
 
Nielsen v Denmark100 involved the incarceration of a child in the psychiatric ward of a 
state hospital. The incarceration of the child was approved by the mother, who was 
the custodial parent at the time.101 The Applicant (child) in this matter challenged the 
lawfulness of his incarceration in the psychiatric ward.   The court had to decide 
whether article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights which guarantees 
everyone the right to freedom and security and only allows for the lawful limitation of 
this right was violated.  
 
 The majority of the court found that mother in her capacity as custodial parent, and 
not the state, had decided to hospitalise the Applicant.102 The Court therefore found 
that there had not been a deprivation of liberty of the child in terms of article 5 of the 
convention.  
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 The minority decision on the other hand favoured the conclusion reached by the  
European Commission of Human Rights.  The minority court held that ‘the specific  
conditions in which the Applicant was admitted to the hospital and placed , against his 
will , in the psychiatric ward, and the length and nature of the committal, are 
important criteria in determining whether the applicant was deprived of his liberty’.103 
The minority of the court found that the State was responsible for the deprivation of 
liberty of the child because ‘it not only tolerated it, but also associated itself with it 
through the action and assistance of its organs’.104 The minority found that there had 
been a violation of article 5 as the applicant had been detained in a psychiatric 
hospital for five and a half months when he was not even mentally unfit.  
 
Van Bueren asserts that the Nielsen case ‘leaves children who are deprived of their 
liberty on the wishes of one or both parents, but against their own wishes, wholly 
unprotected’.105 A further point of contention is the failure of the European Court of 
Human Rights to even consider the principle of incarceration as a last resort in 
determining whether there had been a limitation of the freedom and security of the 
child in terms of article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. It is not clear 
whether the failure on the part of the court to employ the principal stems from a ‘lack 
of awareness’106 in respect of the CRC or whether the failure to acknowledge the 
principal and instead rely on the technical argument that the custodial parent had 
decided to have the child incarcerated was an provided an convenient escape for the 
court. However, it is clear that in its failure to acknowledge the principal of 
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incarceration as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period, the court deprived 
the applicant of the protection afforded to him by the principle. 
 
In Hussain v The United Kingdom,107 the applicant was convicted of killing his two 
year old brother. He was 16 years old at the time and was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment at ‘Her Majesty’s pleasure’ and the applicant was therefore not 
informed of the length of his prison term. Eight years had nearly passed before the 
Secretary of State set the Applicant’s tariff at 15 years.108 The parole board considered 
the Applicant’s possible release on four occasions.109 During the third review of the 
applicant’s possible release, the parole board recommended that the applicant be 
transferred to open prison conditions.110 This recommendation was vetoed by the 
Secretary of State.111  
 
The Applicant applied to the European Court of Human Rights, complaining that his 
right to ‘take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided by 
a court and his release ordered if the detention his release ordered if the detention is 
not lawful.’112 The United Kingdom argued that incarceration during Her Majesty’s 
pleasure was a sentence imposed n juvenile who had committed serious offences but 
due to their youth could not be punished as severely as adults.113 The United Kingdom 
also informed that a legitimate reason for continued incarceration would be where the 
                                                
107
 supra n 93 
108
 Hussain  supra  n93 at para 11 
109
 Hussain supra  n 93 at para 12 
110
 Hussain supra n 93 at para  15 
111
 Ibid 
112
 Hussain supra n 93 at 45 
113
 Hussain supra n93 at 47 
applicant remained a danger to society.114 European Court of Human Rights found 
that there had been a violation of the applicant’s rights.  
 
In T v the United Kingdom115  the applicant and his co-accused, V, had been convicted 
in the Preston Crown Court for the heinous murder of a two year old boy. Both the 
applicant and his co-accused were ten years old at the time of the murder. The trial 
judge recommended a sentence of eight years. The trial judge realised the gravity of 
the sentence remarking that ‘eight years is very many years for a ten or eleven year 
old. They are now children. In eight years time they will be grown men’.116 The 
Secretary of State, however, decided to impose a sentence of fifteen years.  
The applicant submitted that the sentence imposed on him was in breach of article 5 
of the European Convention of Human Rights and furthermore contended that ‘it was 
arbitrary to impose the same sentence – detention during Her Majesty’s – pleasure on 
all young offenders convicted of murder, irrespective of their individual 
circumstances and needs’.117 In support of he’s argument the applicant referred to 
Article 37 (b) of the CRC and rules 16 and 17.1 (a) and (b), referring to the principal 
of detention as a last resort and for the shortest period of time.118  
 
The United Kingdom argued that the detention was not unlawful or arbitrary and that 
the applicant would have to be detained for as necessary to satisfy ‘the need for 
punishment, rehabilitation and the community’.119 The Court, without even referring 
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to the CRC the Beijing Rules in light of the sentence of fifteen years imposed on two 
ten year olds, accepted the argument of the Government.  
 
Detention during Her Majesty’s pleasure is a cruel form of punishment as the juvenile 
is not informed of the length of the imprisonment. The Secretary of State, an arm of 
government, initially decided on the duration of imprisonment. The parole board now 
decides on release and can refuse release if there is a danger to society. However, it is 
not clear how the parole board determines whether society is at risk. The cases 
mentioned in this section indicate that in terms of the law of England, sentences 
imposed on children found guilty of serous offences are not much different to adults 
found guilty of serious offences. The only difference is that adults are not tortured by 
uncertainty in respect of the duration of their prison term.  
 
It is also evident from these cases that the European Court of Human Rights failed to 
take the CRC into account when considering the applications of the juvenile 
applicants. It is also evident that very little weight was accorded to the principle of 
incarceration as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate time. In Nielsen, the court 
did not even refer to the principle. In T, the court referred to the principle but found 
that it was outweighed by other factors such as heinous nature of the crime and the 
interests of the community, which therefore justified the imposition of imprisonment. 
While the decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights were not incorrect, 
it is disappointing that the decisions made by the court do not reflect a decision 
making process that pays cognisance to international norms and values especially 
those principles derived from binding treaties such as the CRC. Somalia and the 
United States of America are the only two countries which have not signed the CRC. 
All other countries are therefore bound by the provisions of the CRC. The principle of 
detention as a last resort is provided for in the CRC and failure by the European Court 
of Human Rights to refer to the provisions of the CRC in sentencing the accused is 
not acceptable. 
 
The decisions of the justices of the European Courts of Human Rights are in stark 
contrast to the South African judiciary. The South African judiciary has had to decide 
upon several cases, some of which are discussed below, involving the principle of 
detention as a last resort and for the shortest period of time. It will be seen from the 
cases discussed that international law has been accorded due weight in the decision 
making process. It is also evident from the case law that the South African juvenile 
justice system is moving towards a constitutional jurisprudence incorporating 
international practices.  
 
4.3 South African legislation  
 
The principle of incarceration as last resort is enshrined in the Constitution120 in s28 
(1) (g). Sentencing proposals in the Law Commission report121 supports the principle. 
The report provides that ‘ proposed legislation should not include any provision for 
prescribed minimum sentences, recently introduced in South Africa by the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997’.122  The Bill therefore provides that  
69. (1) A sentence of imprisonment may not be imposed unless –  
(a)  the child was over the age of 14 years of age at the time of commission of 
the offence; and  
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(b) substantial and compelling reasons exist for imposing a sentence of 
imprisonment, which may include conviction of a serious offence or a 
previous failure to respond to alternative sentences, including  sentences    
with a residential element 
 
It has been argued that the Bill provides a more ‘concrete framework’123 for the 
principle of incarceration as a last resort in that it establishes criteria for 
imprisonment. Provisions in the Bill relating to imprisonment of juveniles reflect a 
balanced approach in the struggle between two conflicting rights – the best interests of 
the child and the interests of the society. While imprisonment of juveniles has not 
been disposed of, strict criteria apply where the sentence imposed is imprisonment.  
 
Nevertheless, minimum sentence legislation as contained in the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act124 is in direct conflict with the principle of incarceration as a measure 
of last resort and for the shortest appropriate time. Minimum sentence legislation is 
contained in section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act,125 which is attached 
hereto as appendix B. The provisions contained in s51 are subject to subsections three 
and six of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.  
 
According to the Criminal Law Amendment Act children below the age of 16 are 
excluded from minimum sentence legislation,126 but 16 and 17 year olds are subject to 
minimum sentence legislation if substantial and compelling reasons exist.127 It appears 
as if minimum sentence legislation is therefore not only discriminatory, as is 
discriminates between children on the basis of age, it is also in direct conflict with the 
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principle of incarceration as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate time, as the 
judicial officer is forced to impose a minimum sentence unless substantial and 
compelling reasons exist. The court’s discretion is therefore limited to substantial and 
compelling reasons.  
 
Carina Du Toit articulates her criticism of minimum sentence legislation by stating 
that ‘minimum sentences are not a measure of last resort, they are a measure of first 
resort, and do not allow an individualised approach to sentencing as required by 
international law’128 The interpretation of minimum sentence legislation relating to 
juveniles has resulted in strong debate amongst the judiciary as is evidenced from the 
case law.  
 
4.4 South African case law on the imprisonment of juveniles and the principle 
of incarceration as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period 
 
The uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of minimum sentence legislation was 
first considered by the Cape Provincial Division in the case of S v Blaauw.129 The 
accused in this matter, an 18 year old man, was convicted of the rape of a young girl 
below the age of 16. The charge of rape of a girl below the age of 16 falls within the 
ambit of s 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.130 The court is therefore bound 
to impose a life sentence, subject to the provisions contained in s 51 (3) and (6) of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act.131 The accused celebrated his 18th birthday six weeks 
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prior to committing the crime and therefore the protection afforded by s 51(3) (b) was 
not applicable to the accused. 
  
The Judge nevertheless considered the implications of s 51 (3) of the Act. The 
personal circumstances of the accused were thoroughly considered by the court. The 
court discussed the accused’s difficult childhood and effect of a prior incarceration in 
reformatory school.132 The court opined that the accused’s incarceration at a 
reformatory school could have had a negative impact on him in light of the fact the 
some reformatory schools are regarded as ‘universities of crime’.133 
 
However, of considerable importance was the fact that the accused turned 18 only six  
weeks before committing the heinous crime of which he was convicted of.134 The 
accused would have fallen within the ambit of section 51(3) if he had committed the 
crime six weeks earlier.135 According to Judge Van Heerden an interpretation of s 
51(3) (b) does not compel a court to impose a minimum sentence on an accused below 
the age of 18 but above the age of 16.136 She further stated that such reasoning is in 
line with Constitutional principles and international law.137 The judge also referred to 
academic opinion, in support of her interpretation of minimum sentence legislation, 
citing Skelton who says: 
 
‘Non-governmental organisations rallied and made both written and oral submissions on the 
draft bill to the Portfolio Committee on Justice, arguing that the idea of minimum sentencing 
                                                
132
 at 262 A – G. The accused was convicted of the crime of breaking and entering when he was 15 
years old and a year later he was convicted of two more crime, namely, breaking into a motor vehicle 
and breaking and entering. The accused was sentenced to incarceration at a reformatory school.   
133
 at 263 A - C 
134
 263 E- F 
135
 Ibid 
136
 at 223 F - G 
137
 at 223 H - I 
for children would go against the UN Convention and the South African Constitution which 
both state that detention of children should be as a matter of last resort, and that minimum 
sentence for children would in fact make imprisonment a first resort, notwithstanding the 
‘escape clause’’138 
 
Van Heerden also refers to Sloth-Nielsen’s submissions that minimum sentence 
legislation does not apply to all children, only 16 and 17 year olds.139 However, the 
state bears the onus of proving that substantial and compelling reasons exist for the 
imposition of a minimum sentence in respect of the accused.140 Adult accused bear the 
burden of proving that minimum sentence legislation does not apply. In further 
support of her interpretation of the legislation, Van Heerden J refers to the Law 
Commission report,141 which refers to the different criteria, applied to 16 and 17 year 
olds. The court therefore found that the arguments by Skelton and Sloth –Nielsen are 
correct as these arguments reflect international and constitutional norms.  
 
The question of whether minimum sentence legislation applies to children between 
the ages of 16 and 18 was once again addressed in S v Nkosi.142 The accused pleaded 
guilty to the charges of murder, theft and housebreaking with intent to steal and the 
attempted theft of a motor vehicle. The accused was 16 years of age when he 
committed the crimes that he was charged with. The trial court imposed a minimum 
sentence of life imprisonment for the murder and seven years in respect of each of the 
housebreaking convictions. The sentences were to run concurrently. The sentence 
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imposed by the trial Judge was overturned by a full bench of the Witwatersrand Local 
Division. 
 
The Nkosi143 judgment presents as well reasoned and constitutionally sound. In 
delivering the judgment, Cachalia J, in a logical and systematic manner explained 
why children between the ages of 16 and 18 were not subjected to minimum sentence 
legislation.  
 
Cachalia J first considered the plain meaning of s 51(3). According to the court 
hearing the appeal, the trial court erred in concluding that it was obligated to impose a 
minimum sentence unless ‘‘substantial and compelling circumstances’’ exist which 
justify deviation from the prescribed sentence. The trial Judge found that while 
substantial circumstances existed in the form of the accused’s youth, it did not compel 
the court to impose a lighter sentence.  
 
The court of appeal did not agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the wording of 
s 51(3) (a) and (b). Pertinent to the appeal court’s interpretation of s 51 (3) were the 
use of the words ‘substantial and compelling’. The appeal court noted that  
 
‘The Act envisages three classes of offender, namely adults, children under the age of 16 and 
children who are between 16 and 18 at the time of the commission of the offence. The Act is 
not applicable to children under the age of 16 (s 51 (6)). This means that a court is 
unencumbered by any legislative prescriptions in deciding an appropriate form of punishment 
for such an offender. A court is obliged to impose a minimum sentence on any offender who 
was at least 18 at the commission of the offence unless it finds substantial and compelling 
circumstances that justify the imposition of a lesser sentence. If such circumstances are found 
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to exist these must be entered on the record and a lesser sentence imposed (s 51 (3) (a)). 
Section 51(3) (b) which is applicable to children between the ages of 16 and 18 contains no 
reference to ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’, but requires a court which decides to 
impose a minimum sentence to ‘enter the reasons for its decision on the record of the 
proceedings.’144    
  
The Courts in Blaauw and Nkosi therefore both concluded that s 53(1) (b) and not s 
53(1) (a) is the applicable section in determining whether a minimum sentence should 
be imposed on 16 and 17 year olds. Cachalia J explained the difference between s 53 
(1) (a) and (b)  
 
‘The distinction between 51(3) (a) and 51(3)(b) lies in the nature of the discretion which the 
Court has when considering the two classes of offenders. In the former case the Court should 
ordinarily impose the prescribed sentence unless there is some weighty justification for the 
imposition of a lesser sentence. The legislature has therefore limited the discretion of the 
Court to depart from the minimum sentence. In the latter case there is no reference at all to 
substantial and compelling circumstances. The express wording of the section only requires a 
court to justify its decision to impose the prescribed sentence by entering its reasons on the 
record. It does not limit the Court’s discretion to impose an appropriate sentence on a 
child between the ages of 16 and 18’145  
 
 The implication of the Blaauw and Nkosi conclusion is that ‘a court was not obliged 
to impose a minimum sentence, unless satisfied that the circumstances indeed justified 
the imposition of such a sentence’.146 The wording of s 51(3) (b) imposes an 
administrative duty on a court imposing a minimum sentence on a 16 or 17 year old in 
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that the court must enter on the record of the proceedings its reasons for the 
imposition of such a sentence.  
 
A different conclusion was reached in Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, 
Transvaal v Makwetsja.147 This case concerned an appeal in the Tranvaal Provincial 
Division against a sentence imposed by the trial court where the accused was 
convicted on a charge of raping a girl child below the age of 16. The accused was 17 
years old at the time of committing the offence. The trial court imposed a sentence of  
five years, wholly suspended for three years on condition that the accused not be 
convicted of rape again during the suspended sentence and that the accused undergoes 
psychiatric therapy. 
 
The legal issue before the Appeal Court related to the correct interpretation of s 51(3) 
(b) of minimum sentence legislation. The question was whether the section applied to 
16 and 17 year olds, or whether the interpretation of the section only requires the 
sentencing court to enter on the record its reasons for imposing a minimum 
sentence?148 
  
In its examination of the s 51(3), the court referred to the English version of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act.149 The court found it strange that the legislature 
would specifically mention and exclude16 and 17 year old children in section 51(3)(b) 
and also exclude all children from minimum sentences in section 51(6).  
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The Judge referred to the reasoning of the court in S v Blaauw150 and S v Nkosi.151 
Bertelsmann J considered the meaning of section 51(3) (b) by holistically considering 
the meaning of s 51.According to the Judge, an interpretation of  s 51(1) warrants the 
conclusion that a life sentence must be imposed subject to subsections (3) and (6).152 
He also added that, a distinction is not made between sections 51(3) (a) and (b) and 
that in fact the latter follows on from the former.153 According to the Judge’s  
interpretation of the section, s 51(3) (a) provides for imposition of a life sentence on 
an accused convicted in terms of s 51(1) only allowing for deviation from such an 
extreme sentence where substantial and compelling reasons exist. Section 51(3) (b) 
follows on from s 51(3) (a) and provides that the sentencing officer must provide 
reasons for imposing a life sentence on an accused who at the time of the offence was 
16 or 17. He reasoned that the fact that the legislature requested reasons to be placed 
on record for the imposition of a minimum sentence on a 16 or 17 year old accused is 
further indicative of the fact that the legislature intended to impose minimum 
sentences on the children who fell into the ambit of the section.   He acknowledged 
that minimum sentences should only be imposed on 16 and 17 where exceptional 
circumstances exist but added that it does not mean that minimum sentences could 
never be imposed on 16 and 17 year olds.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal resolved the debate in respect of the conflicting 
interpretation of the applicability of minimum sentence legislation on 16 and 17 year 
olds in Brandt v S.154  The facts of the case, briefly stated, involved a 17 year old 
accused found guilty of murder, robbery and attempted robbery. The trial court 
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imposed a life sentence. Ponnan AJA referred to the values enshrined in the 
constitution and held that minimum sentence legislation should be interpreted in light 
of constitutional values. 
 
 The court referred to s 28(2) of the Constitution, which states that the child’s best 
interests are of paramount importance.155 The court found that the best interests  
principle warranted the conclusion that ‘child offenders are deserving of special 
attention’156 In its determination of the applicability of minimum sentence legislation, 
the court also referred to the international law and Constitutionally entrenched 
principle of incarceration as a measure of last resort. The court approvingly quoted 
academic opinion being that ‘the principle that detention is a matter of last resort (and 
for the shortest appropriate time) is the leitmotif of juvenile justice reform.157 Those 
principles are articulated in international law and enshrined in section 28(1)(g) of the 
Constitution’.158 Reference was also made to the Bill whereby the court noted that the 
Bill forbids life imprisonment of children.159  
 
The court reasoned that 
 
‘if the notional starting point for the category of offender envisaged in subsection 3 (b) is that 
the minimum prescribed sentence is applicable, as the majority of the court a quo and the full 
bench in Makwetsja suggest, then imprisonment (the prescribed sentence) 160would be a first 
resort for children aged 16 and 17 years in respect of offences covered by the Act instead of a 
last resort.’ 
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  The court found that if the majority judgement in Makwetsja was followed, then the 
sentencing court would have no alternative but to impose a minimum sentence unless 
the accused could convince the court, that substantial and compelling reasons exists 
which allow the court to depart from the prescribed sentence.161 Ponnan AJA further 
added that on the reasoning of the court in Makwetsja, the child accused would be 
burdened in the same way as an adult accused.162 The principle of last resort and for 
the shortest period would therefore be infringed if Makwetsja was followed.163 Such 
an interpretation would also be in conflict with the principles of proportionality and 
individualisation.164 The judge referred to dicta of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the case of V v United Kingdom165 in support of his conclusions regarding 
the principles of incarceration as a last resort for the shortest period, proportionality 
and individualisation. The court concluded that Blaauw and Nkosi approach was 
therefore the preferable approach.  
 
The issue of sentencing child offenders was again dealt with in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v P. 166 This judgement in this case is disappointing and confusing. 
Though Mthiyane JA in many respects reiterated the reasoning of the court in Brandt, 
he nevertheless increased the sentence imposed by the trial court from a postponed 
sentence to a suspended sentence. As in Brandt, the court in DPP v P167  referred to 
Constitutional and International principles. The court found rule 5(1) of the Beijing 
rules applicable in respect of the case before it. These rules refer to the principle of 
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proportionality in respect of the competing rights of the accused, society and the 
gravity of the crime.  
 
The court also referred to a discussion paper released by the South African Law 
Commission Project Committee on Juvenile Justice.168 The court noted that even 
though the committee overwhelmingly supported the principle of incarceration as a 
matter of last resort, it also recommended that imprisonment could be imposed upon 
children who have been convicted of serious and violent offences, in line with Beijing 
rule 17 (1) (c).169 In terms of the dicta of the court, constitutional and international law 
allows for the incarceration of children in certain circumstances.170 However, such 
incarceration is subject to the provision that the child be incarcerated for the shortest 
period of time and be kept separately from adults.171 In support of its argument that 
despite the principle of incarceration as a last resort and subject to the protection of 
detention being for the shortest period of time, the court referred to the Bulgar172 case, 
where two ten year old boys were sentenced to direct imprisonment for the brutal 
killing of a 2 year old child. Terblanche173 criticises the court for referring to the 
House of Lords decision, and not the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights, which was referred to in Brandt.174 
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  In DPP v  P, a 12 year old girl arranged for the brutal killing of her grandmother. 
The court, in great detail, described the heinous nature of the crime.175 The court 
found that in considering the aggravating factors, the imprisonment of the accused 
could be the only just punishment.176 The Judge went on to add that he would have 
imposed direct imprisonment had he been the trial judge177 but that it was now too late 
to impose direct imprisonment.178 
 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the judgment in DPP v P is that the 
constitutional and international principle of incarceration of children should be 
employed, as a measure of last resort must be adhered to. However, the mere 
existence of the principle does not mean that a prison sentence could never be 
imposed on a child. Both constitutional and international law have made provision for 
circumstances where a child could be incarcerated and in taking into account the 
special circumstances regarding the child accused, have included the protection 
clauses of incarceration for the shortest period of time and separation of child and 
adult accused.  
 
The judgment in DPP v P has been subjected to academic criticism.179 Skelton asserts 
that Mthiyane AJA, sent out a confusing message in that the principles laid down in 
Brandt were supported and yet ‘a ringingly clear enunciation of imprisonment as a 
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measure of last resort which was reflected in the judgement of the court a quo’180 was 
not reflected in the Appeal. Skelton also voiced her disappointment at the court’s 
detraction from the principles laid down in S v Z, which states that a suspended 
sentence should not be imposed where the court considers a prison sentence would not 
have been imposed.181 
 
Another disappointing aspect of this case stems from the enormous impact of 
unexplained statements made by the judge, particularly with regard to the statement 
that he would have ‘seriously considered imposing a sentence of imprisonment’182 had 
he been the judge in the court a quo’ and that ‘it is too late to impose a sentence of 
direct imprisonment’. It appears from the judge’s statement that he considers it 
appropriate to impose direct imprisonment on a child who committed a crime at the 
age of 12. It is irresponsible of the judge to send out such a confusing message given 
the vast media attention that this case attracted,183 without laying a basis for such a 
statement. The court should have clarified whether it is permissible to incarcerate 12 
year olds and if so, under what circumstances, factors to be taken into account when 
imposing a prison sentence on a 12 year old and a maximum period of imprisonment.  
 
The court paid great attention to the heinous nature of the crime before alluding to the 
fact that imprisonment could have been imposed in this case. A better approach would 
have been to explore whether imprisonment was a measure of last resort in DPP v P.  
The difficulty in ascertaining when incarceration is a matter of last resort is articulated 
by Terblanche, who states that  
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 ‘at present in South Africa, determining whether imprisonment has become unavoidable is 
squarely within the discretion of the sentencer. Currently this discretion is largely unguided. 
As can be seen from DPP v P, the observer of the court’s judgement simply does not know 
which factors would or could have swayed this case over the ‘last resort’ threshold’.184 
 
Similarly, Terblanche adds that the standard relating to the ‘shortest period of time 
principle, is also a subjective one. 
 
 In DPP v P, the court missed a golden opportunity to extend the sentencing 
guidelines laid down in S v Z, by providing guidelines of factors to be taken into 
account in determining when imprisonment is a measure of last resort. The suspended 
sentence185 imposed by the court would have been more credible if it could have been 
justified in terms of sentence falling within the ambit of the sentence being a measure 
of last resort, as determined by the guidelines.  
 
Minimum sentence legislation negates the principle of detention as a measure of last 
resort and is another example succumbing to public pressure. The numerous debates 
surrounding the Child Justice Bill proves that there is a clear divide between adhering 
to constitutional and international law  that of succumbing to public opinion. When 
the Bill was originally introduced to parliament it was void of any minimum sentence 
legislation. In fact the South African Law Reform Commission vehemently opposed 
the application of Act 105 of 1997 to juveniles. Despite such opposition, it is clear 
from debates in parliament that there is an intention to include minimum sentence 
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legislation in the Child Justice Bill and furthermore ‘exclude diversion on a charge of 
rape for 16 and 17 year olds’.186 Even more disturbing is the reluctance of the 
portfolio committee to completely outlaw the pre-trial detention of children below the 
age of fourteen.187 It is ironic that the Child Justice Bill should include (in 
contravention of original intentions) such harsh provisions which are completely out 
of line with international law and the Constitution and which clearly reflects a move 
away from regarding the child as an individual.  
 
It is apparent from the cases mentioned in this chapter, that in determining an 
appropriate sentence for the child offender, the court must take into account the 
principles of proportionality, individualisation, the best interests of the child, and 
impose a punishment which is in accordance with the principle of imprisonment as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest time possible.188  
 
 Despite the confusing judgment in the case of DPP v P, the later judgment of Gagu v 
S,189 reaffirms the principles laid down in Brandt. The court approvingly quoted the 
Brandt dicta, which states that the ‘substantial and compelling’ criteria is not 
applicable to 16 and 17 year olds, therefore giving the court the discretion to apply the 
usual sentencing criteria in determining an appropriate sentence for 16 and 17 year 
olds.190  
 
Despite national and international legislation strongly supporting the principle of 
detention as measure of last resort  and the a strong judicial move in respect of 
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adhering to the principle of incarceration as a measure of last resort, statistical data 
shows that, in reality,  this principle is not adhered to. Between 1996 and 1999, the 
amount of awaiting trial prisoners increased by 358%.191 Furthermore, despite 
legislation prohibiting the pre-trial detention of children below the age 14, a list of 
names provided by the Judicial Inspectorate of prisons indicate that on 7 March 2006, 
3 children below the age of 14 were awaiting trial in prison.192 Also negating the 
principle of detention as measure of last resort is the fact that on 7 March 2006 ‘21 
unsentenced children were held for over one year and one child had been held 
awaiting trial in prison for 1922 days – over five years.’193  
 
Possible explanations for the flagrant disregard of the principle of detention as a last 
resort could be a poor or non existent infrastructure to accommodate national and 
international legislation. It is not enough to include provisions in legislation which 
state that juveniles below the age of 14 awaiting trial should not be held in prison 
without making available suitable, sufficient and secure care facilities for juveniles 
who cannot be released into the care of a parent or guardian. The practical reality in 
South Africa is that many children are orphans and homeless and therefore if charged 
with committing offence such children will not be released as the prosecution may 
legitimately fear that the child will abscond. Furthermore, ‘inconsistent use by 
magistrates of the above amendments (s29 of the Correctional Services Act) has 
resulted in inappropriate placements of children’.194 
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Juvenile Justice is still a young and developing system of justice. Mechanisms must 
be put in place to ensure its successful development within South African law. One of 
the ways to accomplish such a goal would be by training and educating magistrates 
and prosecutors in applying national and international legislation pertaining to 
children. The principle of incarceration as a last resort should not only be adhered to 
at the sentencing phase of the judicial process or by chance on review of a decision  
made by a lower court as this principle should be adhered to at the very start of the 
criminal process. 
 
The influence of the judiciary in shaping juvenile sentencing practises by imposing 
alternative punishments to imprisonment is considered in the following chapter. The 
discussion of alternative forms of punishment clearly portrays the importance of pre-
sentence reports, as without it the judicial officer would experience difficulty in 
deciding upon a just sentence, which is both in the interest of the community and the 
child. Furthermore, the fact that there is a clear move by the judiciary to impose 
sentences other than prison sentences thereby indicating the propensity of the 
judiciary to give effect to the principle of incarceration as a measure of last resort and 
for the shortest appropriate period.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.        ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING 
5.        International instruments and policies 
Article 40(3) (b) of the CRC, requires that state parties impose sentences other than 
imprisonment when punishing a juvenile offender. Alternative sentencing options are 
also provided for in s18 of the Beijing Rules, which state that: 
18.1 A large variety of disposition measures shall be made available to the competent 
authority, allowing for flexibility so as to avoid institutionalisation to the greatest extent 
possible. Such measures, some of which may be combined, include:  
(a) Care, guidance and supervision orders;  
(b) Probation;  
(c) Community service orders;  
(d) Financial penalties, compensation and restitution;  
(e) Intermediate treatment and other treatment orders;  
(f) Orders to participate in group counselling and similar activities;  
(g) Orders concerning foster care, living communities or other educational settings;  
(h) Other relevant orders.  
18.2 No juvenile shall be removed from parental supervision, whether partly or entirely, 
unless the circumstances of her or his case make this necessary.  
 
The commentary to the Beijing Rules informs that the alternative sentencing options 
as provided for in s 18 (1) of the rules, have been successfully employed in foreign 
jurisdictions. However, the drafters of the rule acknowledged that the resources may 
not be the same in all countries and therefore the rules are stated in general terms, 
allowing state parties to decide on the monetary resources it makes available to 
alternative sentencing dispositions. Lack of resources should not be used as a 
convenient excuse to avoid implementing alternative sentencing options and should 
not on its own be a justification for failure to implement policies which give effect to 
sentencing options which do not include a residential component. While constraints 
and competing priorities of third world countries are acknowledged, creative 
approaches should be adopted to counter these problems. 
 
 An innovative approach adopted in South Africa is a good example of dealing with 
budget constraints. A cost analysis of the draft proposals listed in the 1998 Discussion 
paper was requested by the South African Law Commission.195  A report known as 
the AFReC report196 was produced by economists and provided a cost analysis of the 
proposals contained in the discussion paper.197  The report provided that South Africa 
would make huge monetary savings if the proposals of the discussion paper were 
implemented.198 One pf the proposals in the discussion involved introducing a 
preliminary enquiry in respect of child offenders. The purpose of the preliminary 
enquiry is to determine whether the criminal court process can be avoided and if not 
‘determine the release or placement of the accused’.199 The novel idea of the 
preliminary enquiry would have a domino effect in cost savings as the preliminary 
enquiry would result in  
 
‘the increased use of diversion, lower court case loads, les recourse to detention facilities (both prisons 
and welfare places of safety), and less police expenditure on transporting children between places of 
safety, prisons and courts pending finalisation of their trials’ 200 
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The point made, is that every aspect of the criminal justice system has cost 
implications, which include costs flowing from imprisonment. It is therefore 
imperative to compare the cost of imprisonment to that of alternative sentencing and 
develop sentencing options which reflect a balanced approach in respect of the 
different needs of a particular country.  
 
Similarly the commentary to the Beijing rules also discusses s 18 (2). Section 18(2) 
highlights the importance of involving the family in the task of punishing the child 
offender. The drafters of the s18 have taken an interesting approach to punishing child 
offenders by according joint responsibility for the successful implementation and 
completion of punishment for the child accused to the state, family and community. 
Parents have the responsibility to supervise the punishment of their children. The 
involvement of the state, family and community in punishment is praiseworthy and 
gives effect to the saying ‘my child is your child’, making the development of the 
child into a healthy member of society a societal responsibility. One accepts, however, 
the successful implementation of s 18 (2) in a South African context is questionable   
in light of domestic problems such as poverty, alcohol abuse and family violence.  
 
It will be seen from the discussion below that the existence of alternative forms of 
sentencing is not a new phenomenon in South African Law. However, it will also be 
seen that alternative sentencing options have not always been employed, contributing 
to overcrowding in prisons.201 According to the 2005/2006 annual report by the 
inspectorate of prisons, ‘while 74 prisons had less than 100% occupation, 161 
exceeded 100% occupation with 72 having more than 150% including 38 with more 
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than175%’.202 The statistics provided by the Judicial Inspectorate apply to the prison 
population as a whole but is worth mentioning as overcrowding in prisons impact on 
all detainees including children. A tendency by the judiciary to impose alternative 
sentences to incarceration is evident from recent judgements, which will be elaborated 
on further below.    
 
5.2 South African legislation  
A wide range of alternative sentencing options are provided for in various sections of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977. The relevant sections of the Act dealing with 
alternative sentencing options are s276 (1)(h), s276 (1)(i), s276A (3)(a), s287 (4)(a) 
s287 (4) (b), s290, s296 and s297. These provisions are attached hereto as Appendix 
‘C’. 
 
 Section 276(1)(h) governs the situation where the accused receives a sentence of 
correctional supervision, serving the entire sentence at home without any period of 
imprisonment. Section 276(1)(i) also pertains to correctional supervision but can be 
differentiated from s 276(1)(h) in that the accused serves part of the sentence in a 
prison facility while the remainder of the sentence is served at home under 
correctional supervision.  Sections 276 A (3)(a), 287 (4)(a) and 287(4)(b) deal with 
the conversion of a sentence of either imprisonment or a fine or both to a period of 
correctional supervision. Section 290 provides that offenders below the age of 18 can 
be placed under the supervision of a probation officer, correctional officer, other court 
appointed official or be sent to reform school. Section 296 governs the situation where 
the offender is sentenced to detention at a drug treatment centre. Section 297 provides 
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for further alternatives to incarceration, which include a postponed sentence, 
suspended sentence, community service or discharging the person with a caution or 
reprimand. Section 290 is only applicable to offenders below the age of 18 since an 
age limit is provided for in the section. The rest of the alternative sentencing options 
mentioned herein are applicable to child and adult offenders.  
 
Skelton is of the view that the alternative sentencing options provided for in the 
Criminal Procedure Act are ‘revolutionary’.203 She points out that ss 276A (3)(a) and 
287 (4)(b), ‘allow the judicial officer to change his or her own sentence, which is 
contrary to the general rule of sentencing.’204 She furthermore notes that s287(4)(a) 
allows the Commissioner, without recourse to the court, to convert a sentence of 
imprisonment to that of correctional supervision.205  
 
Alternative sentencing options are not tied to specific offences, thereby giving the 
sentencing officer the discretion of deciding an appropriate sentence. However, the 
discretion of the sentencing officer has been limited by the introduction of minimum 
sentence legislation.206  
 
The Bill provides a host of alternative sentencing options. The alternative sentencing 
options available in the Bill include and extend options available in the Criminal 
Procedure Act.207  
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Sentencing provisions are dealt with in ss 61 to 72 of the Bill. The purpose of the 
sentencing provisions is to ensure the  
 
‘child understands the implications of and be accountable for the harm caused’,208 ‘promote an 
individualised response which is appropriate to the child’s circumstances and proportionate to 
the circumstances surrounding the offence’209, ‘promote the reintegration of the child into the 
family and community’210 and to ‘ensure that any necessary supervision, guidance, treatment 
or services which form part of the sentence assist the child in the process of reintegration’.211 
 
The Bill makes provision for four sentencing options, available to the sentencing 
officer. Section 64 provides for community-based sentences, which simultaneously 
allows the child to remain in the community and carry out the terms of the 
punishment. Included in the options available to the sentencing officer are options 
which would normally be available to an accused had the matter been diverted,212 
such as counselling, attendance at an educational centre or providing a service to the 
community without remuneration. Restorative justice options are dealt with in s 65 of 
the Bill. The restorative justice options available include sending the child for family 
group conferencing or victim-offender mediation. 
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212The section referred to is found at s47 of the Bill which discusses diversion options. Diversion is  not 
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The third alternative, as provided for in s66, available to the sentencing officer 
involves sentencing the child to correctional supervision.213 The fourth alternative to 
imprisonment is dealt with in s66 of the Bill, which provides for a sentence, which 
involving a residential option such as a reformatory school.214  Section 69 of the Bill 
deals with imprisonment, which is imposed as a measure of last resort.   
 
Despite the provision of alternative sentences, Sloth-Nielsen reports shocking 
statistics in respect of children admitted to prisons.215 The statistics provide that for 
the 1998/1999 period, 4630 children were sentenced to imprisonment.216 The number 
of children serving prison sentences increased by 158.67% between 1995 and 2000.217 
Furthermore, in 1999 there were 239 children serving sentences of 5 years or more 
and 58 children serving sentences of 10 years or more.218 More than 50% of the 
children sentenced to imprisonment were convicted of property crimes, 30.8% for 
violent offences, 14.5% for sexual offences, 0.7% for drug related offences and 3.4% 
for other offences219. As at 31 December 2005, there are ‘2354 children under the age 
of 18 in prison, 12 are under the age of 14. 1217 of them are awaiting trial, 1137 are 
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serving sentences’.220 The latest statistics obtained from the department of 
Correctional Supervision indicate that for the 2006/2007 year, 2020 children are 
currently in a prison facility.221 The statistics further indicate that 853 have been 
sentenced to imprisonment, while 1167 children are being detained while awaiting 
trial.  
 
The above statistics detailing the number of children in prisons show that there has 
been a decline in the incarceration of the child prison population. The possibility 
exists that the courts are increasingly employing alternative sentencing options.  
Despite the decline in the amount of child prisoners, 2020 incarcerated children 
remains an unacceptably high number. The statistics indicate that alternative 
sentencing options are not employed nearly as much as it should be, specifically at the 
pre-trial stage, in view of the fact that 1167 children are currently being detained 
while awaiting trial. 
 
 Though the statistics are still not in accordance with constitutional and international 
principles, it has recently been seen in the case law that there is a trend amongst the 
judiciary to refrain from imposing prison sentences. It will also be seen from the case 
law that the change in mindset by the judiciary, was influenced by both international  
 
 
 
 
                                                
220
 Judicial Inspectorate of prisons op cit  n 201 
221
 Department of Correctional Supervision  http://www.dcs.go.za/WebStatistics/  
instruments the Bill. The Courts have attempted to pay deference to the intentions of 
the Bill as far as possible by not imposing prison sentences and by rather choosing 
one of the alternatives to imprisonment. 
 
 
5.3 South African case law on alternative sentencing options 
It is evident from the case law that there has been a change in the judiciary’s attitude 
towards imprisonment of children. While youthfulness has always been regarded as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing child offenders, the effect of youthfulness did not 
necessary save the child from incarceration. Instead, youthfulness has in the past been 
employed as a justification against long term imprisonment.222  
 
In S v Machasa,223 the accuseds were convicted of the gruesome murder of a 
policeman. The attack and subsequent killing was politically motivated.  Three of the 
accused were above the age of 18, while two accused were 16 and 17 years old at the 
time the offence was committed. The trial court imposed a death sentence on the three 
accuseds who were above the age of 18 and imposed a sentence of 20 years on the 
juveniles. The trial court could not impose the death sentence on the juveniles because 
section 277(5)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act  prohibited such a sentence in respect 
of juveniles.224   
  
The court of Appeal found that when imposing sentence the trial court was 
particularly swayed by the gruesomeness of the offence and by the ‘inherently 
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wicked’ attitude of the juveniles.225 However, the Appeal court was not convinced 
that children below the age of 18 had the ability to be ‘inherently wicked’ and instead 
reasoned the juvenile accused may have been negatively influenced, due to their youth 
and immaturity.  The Appeal court cautioned against imposing a long term prison 
sentence on the juveniles advancing the reason that the negative effect of a long term 
prison sentence on the development of the child into an adult should be avoided.226 
The Appeal court therefore reduced the juvenile’s sentence from 20 years to 10 years 
for the 17 year old and 8 years for the 16 year old.  
 
This case clearly indicates that the age of the accused influenced the courts decision in 
respect of the change in sentence. However, the court still imposed a prison sentence 
on the juvenile despite their age. It is also clear from this case that youth was only 
considered as a mitigating factor in so far as the length of the prison sentence was 
concerned and not in respect of imposing an alternative sentence to imprisonment.  
 
The change in attitude of the judiciary in respect of imposing imprisonment can be 
seen in the case of S v T.227 In this case the accused was convicted of assault with the 
intention to do grievous bodily harm, having stabbed the complainant twice with a 
knife. The magistrate sentenced the accused to 12 months imprisonment despite a 
presentence report recommending a suspended sentence. The magistrate refused to 
impose a suspended sentence largely because the accused was considered to be ‘living 
the life of an adult’.228 The Appeal court was of the view that the magistrate was 
mistaken in finding that a prison sentence was appropriate sentence because the 
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juvenile lived like an adult. The Appeal court decided to reconsider the sentence 
imposed and requested another pre-sentence report. However, the court found that the 
second report was not favourable to the accused.229 It is disappointing that the court 
failed to provide reasons as to why the second report is not in the accused’s favour. 
However, despite the unfavourable report the, court set aside the sentence of 
imprisonment and instead imposed a sentence of correctional supervision in terms of s 
276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, which allows for part of the 
sentence to be served  in prison and the remainder at home under correctional 
supervision.230  
 
S v T reflects a change in sentencing tendencies which is further bolstered in the case 
of S v D.231 In the case of S v D, the accused, a 16 year old, was convicted of raping a 
22 year old woman. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment, 
reasoning that the punishment was suitable considering the crime committed.232 In 
determining the suitability of the crime, the trial court considered the personal 
circumstances of the accused as presented by the accused’s legal representative.233 
The legal representative informed the court of the accused’s age, that he was 
unmarried, had no previous convictions and was attending school.234 A pre-sentence 
report was not provided.  
 
The court of Appeal was not satisfied with the manner in which the trial court 
determined the appropriateness of the sentence. The Appeal court found that evidence 
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in respect of the personal circumstance was not sufficient for the trial court to 
determine an appropriate sentence. The Appeal court held that when sentencing a 
juvenile, the starting point cannot be that the crime was so serious that it warrants an 
incarceration of the juvenile.235 The court also added that such reasoning can 
definitely not be supported if a pre-sentence report was not provided to the court.236 
 
Buys J quoted dicta of former courts in which it was held that  
‘… a view which is widely held and which I share, is that it is an advantage to the delinquent 
and to the community that a young man who is a first offender should not have to go to gaol if 
it can legitimately be avoided, because he is likely to come of the gaol a worse character than 
when he went in’237 
 
The court recognised that in appropriate cases juveniles could be sentenced to 
imprisonment.238 However, the court questioned the determination of when a prison 
sentence is appropriate.239 The court held that a good starting point in determining the 
appropriateness of a sentence would be by obtaining a pre-sentence report.240  The 
court therefore held that the trial court did not have sufficient information before it to 
determine an appropriate sentence and therefore referred the matter back to the trial 
court for reconsideration of the sentence. 
 
It is clear from the case of S v D that prison sentences for juvenile should be avoided 
except where the court, on evidence in the form of a pre-sentence report, considers 
imprisonment of the juvenile to be an appropriate sentence.  
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Alternative sentences were endorsed by the Constitutional Court in S v Williams.241  
Williams can be distinguished from cases already mentioned in this section as this 
case dealt with whipping as a punishment. However, the noteworthy dicta of the 
Constitutional Court in respect of alternative forms of punishment must be mentioned 
as it sets the tone for many later decisions. The State argued that whipping was the 
best alternative punishment to imprisonment.242 The State further argued that South 
Africa did not have the physical and human resources to impose any of the other 
alternatives to imprisonment as mentioned in the Criminal Procedure Act.243  
 
Langa J had the following to say in response to the State’s argument that whipping 
was the best alternative to imprisonment: 
 
‘In keeping with International trends, there has been a gradual shift of emphasis away from the 
idea of sentencing being predominantly the arena where society wreaks it vengeance on 
wrongdoers. Sentences have been passed with rehabilitation in mind. The introduction of 
correctional supervision with its prime focus on rehabilitation, through s276 of the Act, was a 
milestone in the process of ‘humanising’ the criminal system. It brought along the possibility 
of several imaginative sentences, including but not limited to, house arrest, monitoring, 
community service and placement in employment. This assisted in the shift of emphasis from 
retribution to rehabilitation.’244   
 
Langa J went on to add that ‘to hand is a growing interest in moves to develop a new 
juvenile system. This impacts directly on the availability of sentencing options for 
juveniles.’245  The Constitutional court voiced its support for alternative sentencing 
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options in the Williams case when it found that the punishment imposed by whipping 
was not in line with Constitutional principles. 
 
The limitations on physical and human resources were also mentioned but the 
Constitutional Courts response to limited resources was that 
 
 ‘to the extent that facilities and physical resources may not always be adequate, it seems that 
the new dynamic should be regarded as a timely challenge to the State to ensure the provision 
and execution of an effective juvenile system. The wider range of penalties now provided for 
in the Act permits a more flexible but effective approach in dealing with juvenile 
offenders’.246  
 
This endorses the Constitutional Court’s support for ‘legal and systemic reform with 
regard to children in the criminal justice system’.247 The dicta of the court further 
indicates that excuses such as limited resources would not be easily allowed by the 
court as it would hinder the reform process. Interestingly, the sentiment of the 
constitutional court in respect of reform in the criminal justice system has been 
reinforced by the AFReC report, which found that huge monetary savings would be 
made if the Bill were implemented. 
 
The Director of Public Prosecutions v P248 is a recent, albeit weak example of the 
court choosing to impose an alternative sentence to imprisonment. In the case of DPP 
v P, the court imposed a suspended prison term of seven years suspended for five  
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years, despite the heinous nature of crime. The dicta of the court in this case is very 
confusing as the court gives the impression that imprisonment would have been an 
appropriate sentence. Nevertheless, imprisonment was avoided by the imposition of a 
suspended sentence, which arguably amounts to a prison sentence.  
 
In the recent case known as ‘M’,249 the Pietermaritzburg High Court overturned an 
eight year sentence for murder and sent the case back to the Regional Court for the 
purposes of a pre-sentence report and a new sentence. M was 13 years old when he 
stabbed and killed a 14year old child.250 He was charged with murder and pleaded 
guilty in the Pietermaritzburg Regional Court and was sentenced to eight years 
imprisonment.251 The Child Law Center appealed against the sentence, and the Appeal 
court found ‘eight years imprisonment for a 13-year-old boy was shockingly 
inappropriate.’252 On reconsidering the sentence, the regional court imposed a 
sentence of three years imprisonment suspended for five years.  
 
Skelton asserts that the later sentence imposed by the court is a creative one.253 In 
terms of the sentence imposed by the court, a Children’s Court enquiry would be 
opened to determine if ‘M’ was a child in need of care and possible alternative 
placements, he would also be placed under the supervision of a probation officer and 
when requested to do so by the probation officer, he would have to participate in 
restorative justice process with the family of the deceased and members of the 
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community.254 It is disappointing to note that at the time that the sentence was 
imposed ‘M’ had already served two years in prison. Pre- trial detentions is factor that 
must seriously be attended to and reduced if any value is to be attached to the 
intentions behind keeping children out of prison by instead imposing alternative 
sentencing options.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has considered the development of juvenile justice sentencing 
jurisprudence by focussing on case law in light of international and constitutional 
principles. Three pivotal areas of reform were considered in this paper, namely pre-
sentence reports, incarceration as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period 
and alternative sentencing. The chapters on pre-sentence reports and incarceration as a 
last resort for the shortest appropriate period were drawn together in the chapter 
discussing alternative sentences, since pre-sentence reports and incarceration as a last 
resort impact on alternative sentences.  
 
It was evident from the case law considered that one system of law, the Criminal 
Procedure Act, governs child and adult offenders alike. It was also evident from the 
case law that this system of law is not effective in dealing with children in trouble 
with the law thereby forcing the judiciary to create child centred jurisprudence which 
takes into account the needs of the child in the sentencing process. It was also evident 
that constitutional and international law and the Bill have been increasingly influential 
in developing the mindset of the judiciary. Various cases have specifically referred to 
the Bill in the course of their judgements.255  The judiciary has therefore been forced 
to perform while Parliament has been dragging its feet in passing the Child Justice 
Bill. Despite delay by Parliament in passing the Bill, itss transcended Parliament and 
has made its mark in the case law.  
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The delay in implementing the Bill is disappointing especially since the legislature is 
aware that the Bill creates a much needed separate criminal justice system for 
children. In his opening address to Parliament the first democratic President of South 
Africa stressed the importance of reforming the criminal justice system in respect of 
juvenile offenders. Various important political leaders attended seminars on assisting 
children who had found their way into the criminal justice system.  
It obviously recognised that far too many South African children were entering the 
criminal system hence the initial priority attached to reforming the criminal justice 
system and in so far as possible keeping children out of prison. However, the initial 
enthusiasm in the reforming child justice appears to have been pushed aside and one 
can only surmise, since there is no other plausible excuse for the delay in passing the 
legislation, replaced with a new agenda of satisfying the voting population.    
 
One therefore wonders how the government intends upholding its promises of 
transformation in a democratic South Africa, when it fails to transform child justice, a 
product of the oppressive Apartheid regime. The former oppressive regime will 
remain part of this democratic South Africa for as long as the government fails to 
implement transformation in child justice. The vicious cycle will continue as children 
from violent, poverty stricken, gang infested and alcohol abusing neighbourhoods 
enter the criminal system as first offenders and exit, inevitably to return again, as 
hardened criminals. It is unacceptable that there are currently 2020 children in prison. 
These children should be attending school in preparation for their bright future. Sadly, 
they attend ‘universities of crime’ in preparation for a life of crime. 
 
 The government should be the forerunner in keeping these vulnerable children out of 
the criminal system. Instead, the judiciary has been shouldering the burden creating a 
child justice jurisprudence which recognises constitutional and international principles 
the impact of the oppressive past on the vulnerable youth. 
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 APPENDIX A – CRC Provisions 
Article 37 provisions: 
States Parties shall ensure that:  
(a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release 
shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age;  
(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, 
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used 
only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time 
Article 40 provisions: 
1. States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as 
having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the 
child's sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child's age and the 
desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role 
in society.  
2. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of international instruments, States 
Parties shall, in particular, ensure that:  
(b)Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least the 
following guarantees:  
(iii) To have the matter determined without delay by a competent, independent and impartial 
authority or judicial body in a fair hearing according to law, in the presence of legal or other 
appropriate assistance and, unless it is considered not to be in the best interest of the child, in 
particular, taking into account his or her age or situation, his or her parents or legal guardians;  
(iv) Not to be compelled to give testimony or to confess guilt; to examine or have examined 
adverse witnesses and to obtain the participation and examination of witnesses on his or her 
behalf under conditions of equality;  
(vii) To have his or her privacy fully respected at all stages of the proceedings.  
3. States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and 
institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having 
infringed the penal law, and, in particular:  
(a) The establishment of a minimum age below which children shall be presumed not to have 
the capacity to infringe the penal law;  
(b) Whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such children without 
resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are fully 
respected.  
4. A variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and supervision orders; counselling; 
probation; foster care; education and vocational training programmes and other alternatives to 
institutional care shall be available to ensure that children are dealt with in a manner 
appropriate to their well-being and proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B – s 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
51. Minimum sentences for certain serious offences 
 (1) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a High Court shall- 
 (a) if it has convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2; or 
 (b) if the matter has been referred to it under section 52 (1) for sentence after the person 
 concerned has been convicted of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2, 
 sentence the person to imprisonment for life. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court or a       
High Court, including a High Court to which a matter has been referred under section 52(1)     
for sentence, shall in respect of a person who has been convicted of an offence referred         
to in- 
(a) Part II of Schedule 2, sentence the person, in the case of- 
  (i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15 years; 
(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less 
 than 20 years; and 
  (iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to   
   imprisonment for a period not less than 25 years;   
  (b) Part III of Schedule 2, sentence the person, in the case of- 
(i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 10 years; 
(ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a period not less 
than 15 years; and 
(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a 
 period not less than 20 years; and 
  (c) Part IV of Schedule 2, sentence the person, in the case of- 
 (i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 5 years; 
 (ii) a second offender of any such offence, to imprisonment for a  
  period not less than 7 years; and 
(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offence, to  
 imprisonment for a period not less than 10 years: 
Provided that the maximum sentence that a regional court may impose in terms of 
this subsection shall not be more than five years longer than the minimum sentence 
that it may impose in terms of this subsection 
(3) (a)  If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial and  
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than 
the sentence prescribed in those subsections, it shall enter those circumstances on the 
record of the proceedings and may thereupon impose such lesser sentence.  
  (b) If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) decides to impose a sentence  
  prescribed in those subsections upon a child who was 16 years of age or older, but  
  under the age of 18 years, at the time of the commission of the act which constituted 
  the offence in question, it shall enter the reasons for its decision on the record of the  
  proceedings. 
(6)  The provisions of this section shall not be applicable in respect of a child who was 
under the age of 16 years at the time of the commission of the act which constituted 
the offence in question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C – Criminal Procedure Act provisons 
S 276(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other law and of the common 
law, the following sentences may be passed upon a person convisted of an offence, 
namely –  
(h) correctional supervison 
(i) imprisonment from which such a person may be placed under correctional 
supervision in his discretion by the Commissioner. 
 
S276A (3)(a) Where a person has been sentenced by a court to imprisonment for a 
period – 
(i) not exceeding five years; or 
(ii) exceeding five years, but his date of release in terms of the provisions of the 
Correctional Services Act, (Act 8 of 1959) and the regulations made thereunder is 
not more than five years in the future,  
the Commissioner may if he is of the opinion that such a person is fit to be 
subjected to correctional supervision , apply to the clerk or the registrar of the 
court, as the case may be, to have the person appear before the court a quo  in 
order to reconsider the said sentence. 
 
S 287 (4) Unless the court which has imposed a period of imprisonment as an 
alternative to a fine has directed otherwise, the Commissioner may in his 
discretion at the commencement of the alternative punishment or at any point 
thereafter, if it does not exceed five years –  
(a) act as if the person were sentenced to imprisonment as referred to in section 
276(1)(i); or 
(b) apply in accordance with the provisions of section 276A(3) for the sentence to 
be reconsidered by the court a quo, and thereupon the provisions of section 
276A(3) shall apply mutatis mutandis  to such a case. 
 
S 290 
 (1) Any court in which a person under the age of eighteen years is convicted of 
any offence may, instead of imposing punishment upon him for that offence –  
(a) order that he be placed under the supervision of a probation officer or a 
correctional officer; or 
(b) order that he be placed in the custody of any suitable person designated in the 
order; or 
(c) deal with him in terms of a and b 
(d) order that he be sent to reform school 
(2) Any court which sentences a person under the age of eighteen years to a fine, 
may in addition to imposing such a punishment, deal with him in terms of 
paragraph (a),(b),(c) or (d) 
 
S 296 
 (1) A court convicting any person of any offence may, in addition to or in lieu of 
any sentence in respect of such an offence, order that the person be detained at a 
treatment centre established under the Prevention and Treatment of Drug 
Dependency Act, 1992, if the court is satisfied from the evidence or from any 
other information placed before it , which shall in either of the said cases include a 
report of a probation officer, that such a person is a person as is described in 
s21(1) of the said Act, and such order shall for the purposes of the said Act be 
deemed to be made under s22 thereof: Provided that such order shall not be made 
in addition to any sentence of imprisonment (whether direct or as an alternative to 
a fine) unless the operation of the whole of such sentence is suspended. 
 
S297  
(1) Where a court convicts a person of any offence, other than an offence in 
respect of which any law prescribes a minimum punishment, the court may in 
its discretion-  
(a) postpone the sentence for a period not exceeding five years and release the 
person concerned –  
(i) on one or more condition, whether as to –  
(aa) compensation 
(bb) the rendering to the person aggrieved of some specific benefit 
or service in lieu of compensation for damage or pecuniary loss 
(cc) the performance without remuneration and outside the prison 
of some service for the benefit of the community under the 
supervision and control of an organisation or institution which, or 
person who, in the opinion of the court, promotes the interests of 
the community ( in this section referred to as community service)  
(ccA) submission to correctional supervision  
(dd) submission to instruction or treatment 
(ee) submission to the supervision or control (including control 
over the earnings or other income of the person concerned) of a 
probation officer as defined in the Probation Services Act, 19991 
(Act 116 of 1991) 
(ff) the compulsory attendance or residence at some specified 
centre for a specialised purpose; 
(gg) good conduct; 
(hh) any other matter, 
and order such person to appear before the court at the expiration 
of the relevant period; or  
(ii) unconditionally, and order such person to appear before the 
court, if called upon before the expiration of the relevant period, or 
(b)        pass sentence but order the operation of the whole or any part    
            thereof to be suspended for a period not exceeding five years on  
            any condition referred to in paragraph (a)(i) which the court may  
             specify in the order; or  
             (c)       discharge the person concerned with a caution or reprimand, and   
                        such discharge shall have the effect of an acquittal, except that the  
                        conviction shall be recorded as a previous conviction. 
  
 
                  
 
 
